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BLURRED VISIONS: 
THE POLITICS OF CIVIL OBLIGATION 
Allan C. Hutchinson* and Robert Maisey** 
The snail had known better days. And the unsuspecting May Donoghue was 
to know healthier times. But this unlikely encounter between a decomposing 
mollusc and a Scottish shop assistant on a fateful day in 1928 set the main 
stage for the evolving drama of the Anglo-Canadian common law. When 
Mrs. Donoghue and her friend went to Paisley's Wellmeadow Cafe on a 
bright sunny August evening. she could have had no inkling of the doctrinal 
mayhem that their innocent social outing was to wreak. Seeking only modest 
refreshment, she received a severe dose of gastro-enteritis and a few days in 
Glasgow Royal Infirmary. Championed by the irrepressible Walter Leechman, 
she was able to obtain five years later from the estate of the late David 
Stevenson, the offending ginger beer's manufacturer, a settlement of $200 
for her troubles. As for the snail, we will never know whether its notoriety 
was deserved or whether it is one of the most mismaligned creatures in the 
law's menagerie. 
Notwithstanding Mrs. Donoghue' s illness, it was the law that probably 
suffered the more lasting discomfort and substantial harm. Indeed, Thomas· 
Minchella, the cafe's owner, served up a noisome concoction that the common 
law has still not managed to get out of its system and that continues to cause 
more than its fair share of doctrinal queasiness. However, courts and 
commentators have been slow to realize that the real challenge is not to cure 
the common law of this contagion, but to accept that its blighted condition 
is its natural state of (un)health. In legal terms, Donoghue v. Stevenson1 was 
the first major case to explore the fractious relation between contract and 
tort. Lord Atkin's pioneering judgment set the tone and standard for future 
doctrinal contributions to the law and politics of civil obligation. As such, it 
has become both the bane and boon of legal doctrine's existence: it has 
ensured that tort law remains the battleground of social theory .2 
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Han Law School, York University, Toronto. 
** Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. 
1 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932) A.C. 562. 
2 W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on th.e Law of Torts (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing 
Company, 1984) at 15. 
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GHOST STORIES 
Looking back at the law of civil obligations over the past sixty years is like 
watching the re-run of a bad gothic horror/romance movie. It is third-rate 
melodrama that is long on lack-lustre thrills and ·spills, but short on sustained 
storyline and substantial reflection. The script seems to unfold in spite of itself 
through stilted and uneven dialogue and the plot progresses in fits and starts 
through a haphazard series of contrived crises. Working with an all-too-familiar 
cast of characters and settings, there is an endless working and re-working of 
hackneyed routines and trite set-pieces. It is a cinematic chronicle that is as 
plodding as it is predictable and as unfocused as it is unenlightening. In short, 
the doctrinal history of civil obligations comes as something of an intellectual 
pastiche of Dallas, Twin Peaks, Gone With The Wind and Nightmare on Elm 
Street. It might appropriately be titled A Dog's Breakfast.3 
At the heart of this legal soap-opera are two star-crossed lovers, the more 
traditional Contract and the less established Tort. Irresistibly drawn together, 
but fundamentally incompatible, e.acb is trying to cope with the changing demands 
of historical living and to forge a robust and independent identity for itself 
within the context of a shared relationship. However, Contract and Tort's efforts 
are daunted and haunted by the judicial ghosts of doctrine past: Lord Buckmaster 
is heard to chant with monotonous regularity - "if one step, why not fifty?" ;4 
Lord Abinger is convinced that, if privity of contract is relaxed, "the most 
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I cannot see the limit, would 
ensue";5 Baron Bramwell never tires of preaching the virtues of a sturdy 
self-reliance that frowns upon whinging efforts to shift blame for one's own 
misfortunes to others;6 and Lord Atkin dogs them with his obsessive search 
for "some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which 
the particular cases found in the books are but instances." 7 
Plagued by these judicial phantasms, Contract and Tort have still sought 
to make a go of things. Beginning almost a century earlier, the acquaintance 
of Contract and Tort only blossomed into a friendship in 1932. After a lengthy 
courtship, in which tort seemed to have redressed the doctrinal imbalance 
between them, their engagement was formally announced in 1968. With judicial 
encounters of the ghostly kind apparently no longer a problem, the union of 
contract and tort was solemnized in 1982 in a much anticipated and publicised 
wedding.8 Always a difficult match of theoretical opposites, there was soon 
3 See infra, note 48: A. W. B. Sim~on, A History of the Common Law of Contract (Oxford: 
Claredon Press, 1975) at 325. 
4 Supra, note 1 at 582. 
5 Wright v. Winterbottom (1842), 152 E.R. 402 at 405. 
6 Holmes v. Mather (1875), L.R. 10 Ex. 261. 
7 Supra. note 1 at 592. 
8 See Smith, "Economic Loss and The Common Law Marriage of Contracts and Tort" (1984) 
18 U.B.C.L. Rev. 95 at 101. 
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jurisprudential trouble in doctrinal paradise. Almost before the honeymoon 
had begun, the academic nay-sayers and scholarly kill-joys were out in force. 
Fuelled by rumours of discontent and discord, the judicial phantasms 
reappeared. Indeed, it became clear to those in the know that the marriage 
had never been consummated. In 1990, in a thoroughly expected and suitably 
weighty announcement, the annulment of Contract and Tort's nuptials was 
finalised: each was free to pursue its own life, unencumbered by concerns 
and responsibilities for the other. 
In this ill-fated saga, the scenes about the possibility of tortious recovery 
for pure economic loss are a pivotal part of the story-line. Unfortunately, 
they are particularly confused and confusing. Among the doctrinal detritus 
of snails, peeling floors, diseased cattle> broken bridges, dead fish and 
collapsing walls, the judicial actors grope for a connecting thread or a 
convincing solution. There is an almost constant flip-flopping of tentative 
conclusions and proposed resolutions. Unfortunately, the advice that, "when 
the ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval 
chains, the proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred,"9 
is easier said than done. The path to justice is always in doubt and, in doctrinal 
matters, the ghosts are never less real than anything else. This is especially 
evident in the area of recovery for economic loss where Contract and Tort 
share so.1pe of their most passionate moments and where the ghosts of judicial 
past are at their most bedeviling best. 
In this essay, we want to present a critical review of tort law. It is not 
our intention to try and give 'right' answers10 or extricate judges from the 
doctrinal dilemma that they find (or have put) themselves in.11 However, 
even though we are critical of current practice and doctrine, it is not our 
intention to engage in another bout of judge-bashing for its own sake. The 
overriding concern is to present a rudimentary theory of tort law. Like all 
efforts at good criticism, its avowed ambition is to clear the analytical ground 
and direct lawyers in what is the most useful way to proceed in their efforts 
to make a better world. It will be enough if we manage to advance the 
understanding of our present predicament In this way, it might be that, with 
T.S. Eliot, although we will "arrive where we started," we will "know the 
place for the first time."12 
In the first part of the essay, we outline the larger theoretical agenda 
that is implicated in the doctrinal inquiry over whether to allow tortious 
9 United Australia lid. v. Barclays Bank lid., [1941) A. C. 1 at 29 per Lord Atkin. 
IO See Feldthusen, "&onomic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: Yesterday and Tomorrow" 
(1991) 17 Can. Bus. L.J. 356; Cherniak and Stevens, "Two Steps Forward or One Step Back?: 
Anos at The Cro.ssroads in Canada" (1992) 18 Can. Bus. L.J. 164. 
11 See Schlosser, "What Has Become of Anos?" (1991) 29 A.L.Rev. 673; Rafferty, "Case 
Conunent" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 381. 
12 
"Little Gidding" in The Collected Works of T.S. Eliot. 
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recovery for pure economic loss. Secondly, there is a brief account of the 
historical casemarks in the modern chronicle of its legal development. Next, 
we reveal the indeterminacy that pervades the judicial attempts to explain 
the hodge-podge of rules and exceptions that c9mpromise the existing law. 
Fourthly, going beyond the extant doctrine, the spcial visions that animate 
and frame the doctrine's twists and turns are introduced. Fifthly, we trace 
the more general political currents that have impacted upon and influenced 
the doctrinal gravitation toward one or other social vision. Sixthly, there is 
a critical exploration of the crucial and contorted relation between Contract 
and Tort. Finally, there are some concluding thoughts on the continuing saga 
of civil obligations. 
A THEORETICAL PRIMER 
Most disciplines seek to resolve a set of core issues. Although these issues 
can appear deceptively simple, their underlying complexity tends to make 
fools of the most expert. The study of law is no different. However, while 
other disciplines seem to experience occasional lapses of professional 
confidence, law seems to exist in a permanent state of identity-crisis. Legal 
experts are forever haunted by their own foolish shadows and the echoes of 
some past failed prognostication. The spirited revival of jurisprudential writing 
in the past decade or so has merely served to exacerbate that experience. The 
deeper questions of law, politics and society are now firmly back on the law 
school agenda; their pertinence and unsettling influence is clearly visible in 
most self-respecting pieces of scholarship. In Canada, this renaissance bas 
been given a greater salience and sharpness by the enactment of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. But its effect is powerfully present in so-called 
private law scholarship. Discontented with a facile recounting of the 
case-by-case development of the cases, the best in tort scholarship has striven 
to plumb the deeper theoretical reaches of civil obligation. 
Much of legal scholarship's particular energy and motivation is drawn 
from a more general desire to resolve the central dilemma of modern social 
theory - to provide an account of how social structures and values relate 
to the material conditions of life. Without some plausible explanation of this 
relation, the validity of social knowledge is suspect and the status of social 
theorizing remains deeply problematic. The challenge for contemporary 
scholars has been to provide an account of how large and local struggles 
over social structures and values - from efforts to combat widespread sexist 
and racist practices to attempts to overcome poor working conditions and 
abusive intimate relations - relate to the dynamic system of material 
conditions without reducing them entirely to epiphenomena! effects of that 
system. In short, the need to avoid totalistic, static or vulgarly instrumental 
analyses of social life must not be satisfied at the expense of divorcing social 
structures and values from the historical context and setting from which they 
take shape and upon .which, in turn, they react. 
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As a branch of social theory, legal theory is obliged to share in that 
explanatory task and to run similar risks. Although less self-conscious in 
their reflections, legal scholars have grappled with this intellectual and political 
imperative in their debates over the 'Rule of Law'. Both left and right have 
sought to appropriate its powerful rhetorical appeal for their own political 
campaigns.13 Yet mainstream legal scholarship bears an additional burden -
the task of distinguishing law from other social structures and political 
practices. In order to preserve the legal system's authority and legitimacy, 
traditional theorists must provide an explanation of social theory that not 
only addresses the relation between social phenomena and material existence, 
but that maintains law's autonomy from other social institutions. Can we 
know the judgment from the judge? Is law the result of a patriarchal or 
capitalist conspiracy? Is law the repository of transcendent principles? Thus 
the central mission of conventional jurisprudence bas been to provide a 
convincing account of the relation between legal doctrine and socio-economic 
conditions that, at the same time, preserves a distinction between law and 
politics. Without such a distinction, law and lawyers will lose their claims 
to be the privileged and prestigious guardians of collective power: they will 
become only its naked purveyors. 
In contemporary debate, there is almost complete agreement that law is 
neither fully beholden to socio-economic conditions nor fully independent 
from them. That law might not possess any autonomy or distinctiveness as 
a mode of thinking and acting is hardly ever taken seriously. Conversely, 
the belief that law can be thought about as an entirely autonomous field of 
human activity is rare.14 Rather than make a futile Kelsenian attempt " to 
free the science of law from alien elements" , the present concern is to reveal 
the formal and substantive connections between law and these "alien 
elements".15 Indeed, contemporary jurisprudence seems to find an otherwise 
elusive intellectual and political unity in the notion that legal doctrine is 
"relatively autonomous" from the political formation of social life. 
Unfortunately, this unity is more app;rrent and superficial than real and 
informing. The notion of "relative autonomy" is so ample l;hat it can 
accommodate almost all theorising about law. As such, it can offer little 
guidance or comfort to those seriously committed to explicating the 
law-and-politics conundrum. There is a vast and intellectually significant 
difference between those scholars who maintain that law is primarily separate 
13 See Hutchinson and Monahan, "Democracy and The Rule of Law" in The Rule of Law: 
Ideal or Ideology, ed. by A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan, (Toronto: Carswell, 1986). 
14 The exception to this is, of course, the work of Ernie Weinrib; see supra, Ch. 1. In a series 
of articles, he has sought to develop a theory of tort law that is truly formalist in ambition and 
achievement For an account and critique of that attempt, see Hutchinson, •vnie Importance of 
Not Being Ernest" (1988) 34 McGill L.J. 233. 
15 H. Kelson, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 
')0(\ 
THE PO Lill CS OF CIVIL OBLIGATION I A.C. HUTClilNSON AJ:ID R MAISEY 
from society, but is partly determined by it, and those who hold that law is 
primarily determined by society, but is partly separate from it. The differences 
between these positions are more than matters of emphasis and degree. 
While it is possible and desirable to offer sensible explanations of 
doctrinally discrete and historically specific regio.ns of legal and social 
change, scholars should resist the temptation to go further. It is mistaken to 
extrapolate from those findings to more universalisable statements about law 
in general at different times and in different places. As traditional Kuhnian 
wisdom reveals, any account (including, of course, this one) will itself be 
contingent upon historical circwnstances and social context. Any kind of 
functionalist or instrumentalist account of the relation between law and 
politics, whether it comes from the right, left or centre of the political 
spectrum, is unconvincing.16 The relation between law and social conditions 
is indeterminate and indeterminately so. Like law and society itself, their 
relationship is contingent and its precise nature will vary with the context. 
In the same way that the socio-economic context underdetermines law, that 
very same law overdetermines the possible outcomes to any legal dispute. 
As such, law is an adventure in indeterminacy that is always moving, but 
never reaching its destination. 
Moreover, all accounts of the relation between law and social conditions 
will be defeated by the fact that a theory will not be able to achieve the 
appropriate mix of analytical generality and historical particularity. If a theory 
of tort law is to achieve normative respectability and predictive power, it 
will have to move beyond rich and localised descriptions of law and prevailing 
social conditions. If that is all it does, it fails in its analytical ambitions. But, 
once this move is made, the theoretical offering will be unable to account 
for a sufficient range of legal and social data and lose its descriptive accuracy 
and integrity. Traditional theories of tort law become consigned to a contingent 
purgatory of frustrated achievement. As such, indeterminacy is seen to be an 
ineradicable and pervasive part of knowledge about ourselves, our situation 
and our theorising about them. 
In this essay, we want to state and develop a particular understanding 
of the organic relation between law and the social conditions of life. Although 
the informing insight will be the indeterminacy of that relation and any 
theoretical attempts to understand it, we will suggest that this does not mean 
that theory's ambition is self-defeating nor that 'anything goes'. In one of 
the authors' work to date, there has been an explicit attempt to provide and 
defend such a theoretical understanding of law and politics' organic relation. 
Indeed, that work has been criticised from many quarters. Some have 
complained that the critique of legal doctrine is too instrumental and neglects 
16 While the work of Ken Cooper-Stephenson is admirable in ambition, it is mistaken to attempt 
to pass off his suggestion that tort law is committed to the progressive unfolding of an egalitarian 
ethic as a descriptive clai~ rather than as a prescriptive proposal. See supra, Chs. 1 & 3. 
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its intellectual autonomy and transformative possibilities.17 Others have 
objected that the critique overstates the indeterminacy of legal doctrine and 
ignores its instrumental connections to larger political forces.18 Accordingly, 
in light of such a double threat, the time is ripe to undertake lhe ambitious 
and important project of illustrating the politics of legal indeterminacy by 
tracking the modern development of the law of torts and its relation to other 
social structures, material conditions and intellectual currents. 
In order to situate this theoretical account, we will concentrate on the 
development of Anglo-Canadian torts over the past sixty years. The focus 
will be on the contorted relationship between contract and tort. We will 
concentrate on judicial efforts to confront and resolve tbe perennial puzzles 
of recovery for so-called 'pure economic loss'. In particular, the enduring 
and unresolved question of whether Mrs. Donoghue can recover for the 
diminished value of her ginger beer will be addressed. Because there has 
been considerable doctrinal movement, there is more than the usual amount 
of judicial introspection on the theoretical underpinnings of tort law and the 
nature of the judicial enterprise. Also, this bas in turn occasioned considerable 
scholarly speculation upon the motivation and causes of those developments. 
Furthermore, du.ring this period, there has been a considerable and conscious 
re-alignment in political ideologies in England and Canada - the supposed 
Thatcher-Mulroney revolution of the neo-conservative, free-market Right. It 
will be argued, therefore, that the varying trajectory of tort law and the related 
shifts in contract law offer a vivid opportunity to assess the relation of legal 
doctrine to these broad changes in the constitutive context of political culture. 
AT A LOSS 
No claim was made by Mrs Donoghue for the reduced value of her ginger 
beer; she had more important and pressing concerns. But it is highly unlikely 
that she would have been successful in such a claim.19 Since 1875, there had 
been a rule against the recovery of economic loss in tort. In Cattle v. Stockton 
Waterworks Co.,20 water from the defendant's pipe had negligently flooded 
the soil under a road. The plaintiff was employed by a third party to build 
a tunnel under the road. The plaintiffs work was flooded and it incurred 
excess costs not covered by its lump sum contract. Recovery was denied 
because the loss was economic and not covered by any contractual relationship 
between the parties. The defendant had no responsibility: this was a relational 
17 See, for example, Macklem, "Of Texts and Democratic Narratives" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. at 
114. 
18 See, for example, Hunt, "Living Dangerously on The De.constructive Edge" (1988) 26 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. at 869. 
19 It needs to be emphasised that we do not intend to trivialise our account by focussing on a 
bottle of ginger beer. The aim is to use the infamous product as a symbol for all other and 
more valuable goods and services. 
20 (1875), L.R. 10 Q.B. 453. 
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economic loss to be borne by the employees. While this decision is still 
considered the leading authority on economic loss, it ought not to be forgotten 
that it was decided over 50 years before the modem law of negligence was 
born. Although regularly incanted, its persuasiv~ness is more historical than 
principled in force. . 
Contrary to common understanding, D01wghue v. Stevenson did not 
release tort liability onto an unsuspecting legal world. While contract was 
the primary mode of civil obligation, there existed a patchwork quilt of statutory 
and judicial schemes of tort liability. Donoghue extended liability to some 
new areas, but also softened legal responsibility in other older areas from 
one of strict liability to negligence.21 In his celebrated judgment, Lord Atkin 
introduced the general notion that a civil obligation arises between 'neighbours' 
to take care for each other's safety. Consequently, Mrs. Donoghue could 
recover damages for her sickness and, because they were a direct consequence, 
any lost wages. Yet, in a prescient dissent that has come to haunt the 
development of tort law, Lord Buckmaster argued that once such duties are 
held to exist, apart from those implied by contract or imposed by statute, 
they will consume the law of civil obligations: "if one step, why not fifty?"22 
Nevertheless, while Donoghue extended the general provenance of negligence 
liability, it remained silent on the recovery of pure economic loss and, in 
particular, whether Mrs. Donoghue could claim for the diminished value of 
the ginger beer. Until 1964, the courts continued to set their collective face 
against allowing recovery for pure economic loss.23 
The turning-point was Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners 
LJd.24 While focused on possible liability for negligent statements, it clearly 
carried enormous implications for the issue of economic loss at large. fu Hedley 
Byrne, the defendant had provided information to the plaintiff about the financial 
status of a third party. The information was wrong and the plaintiff subsequently 
suffered substantial economic loss. The House of Lords was prepared to lift 
the rule against the recovery of pure economic loss because the defendant knew 
that the plaintiff might act on the advice. The loss, being associated with regular 
commercial contracts, was incurred in a relationship that was essentially 
contractual in nature and, therefore, could be recovered. However, the defendant 
had provided the inf9rmation with a disclaimer clause attached. Again, this 
evidenced the contractual overtones of the transaction and permitted the defendant 
to escape liability. Accordingly, while the case was grounded in tort law, 
21 Abel, "Torts" in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, ed. by D. Kairys. (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1982); Rabin, "The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A 
Reinterpretation" (1982) 15 Ga. L. Rev. 925. 
22 Supra, note I at 582. 
23 See; for example, Brandon Electrical Engineering Co. (Leeds) Ltd. v. William Press &: Son 
Ltd. (1956), 106 L.J. 332. 
24 [1964] A.C. 465. 
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principles of contract led to its disposition. Moreover, Hedley Byrne left the 
law in a state of considerable confusion. Prior to the decision, there was no 
liability for negligent statements or pure economic loss. After the decision, 
there was recovery for negligent statements and, of necessity, for pure economic 
loss. Did this mean that pure economic loss was now generally recoverable? 
Or was it, in a somewhat ironic doctrinal twist, that pure economic loss was 
only recoverable in connection with negligent statements, a category that had 
previously given rise to no tort liability at all? 
In a series of subsequent cases, the courts seemed to hold fast to the rule 
against the recovery of economic loss unless accompanied by and consequential 
upon physical or property damage.25 For instance, in Spartan Steel & Alloys 
Ltd. v. Martin & Co. 26, the defendant struck an electrical wire that serviced the 
plaintiffs factory. The plaintiff lost property damaged by the electrical power 
cut-off and had to stop production until power was restored. The court held 
that, while the profit from the property that was damaged could be recovered 
from the defendant as it was directly consequential upon the defendant's 
negligence, the lost profits from the inability of the plaintiff to continue production 
in the time that the factory was closed could not be recovered as there had 
been no property damage during that period. It was a pure economic loss whose 
recovery would normally be governed by a contractual relationship. In a strong, 
but now ignored, dissent, Edmund Davies allowed recovery for all the lost 
profits because they were foreseeable and direct. 
The Canadian courts steered a similar course to that of their English 
counterparts. However, in the leading case of Rivtow Marine v. Washington 
Iron Works21, the Supreme Court tried to go in opposite directions at the 
same time. The result was predictably painful. Learning that a crane similar 
to their own had collapsed and killed its operator, the plaintiff inspected its 
own crane and found serious structural defects. The plaintiff took the crane 
out of service and claimed for the costs of repair and for lost profits during 
the period of repair. The majority held that such losses, as they were not 
consequential upon physical or property damage, were not recoverable. 
However, in a fascinating twist, the court allowed recovery of some of the 
lost profits as a result of the manufacturer's failure to warn the plaintiff of 
certain dangers that had come to its attention. As the defendants could have 
issued warnings in the low season, the plaintiff received the difference in 
profits between low and high season when it was obliged to take the crane 
out of service. In dissent, Laskin would have also allowed recovery of repair 
costs as they were incurred to prevent threatened physical harm. Nevertheless, 
25 See Weller & Co. v. Foot and Mouth Institute, [1966] l Q.B. 569; Electrochrome Ltd. v. 
Welsh Plastic Ltd., (1968] 2 All E.R. 205; S.C.M. (U.K.) Lid. v. W.J. Whittall & Son l.Jd., [1970] 
3 All E.R. 245. 
26 [1973] Q.B. 27. 
27 [1974] S.C.R. 1189. 
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the whole court confumed its doctrinal acceptance of a no recovery rule, but 
sought to carve out justifiable exceptions to it. 
Although primarily concerned with the tort liability of municipalities, 
the House of Lords' decision in Anns v. London Bprough of Merton28 accepted 
that, where there had been a negligent failure. to inspect properly the defective 
foundations of a housing block and structural damage had begun to appear, 
the plaintiff could recover the reduced market value of the property. In seeking 
to establish a single framework for analyzing the duty of care, Lord Wilberforce 
made his contentious pronouncement: 
Through the trilogy of cases in this House, Donoghue v. Stevenson, Hedley 
Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. and Home Office v. Dorset Yacht 
Co. Ltd., the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty 
of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of 
that situation within those previous situations in which a duty of care has been 
held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one 
has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has 
suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood 
such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part 
may be likely to cause damage to the latter, in which case a prima facie duty 
of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is 
necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, 
or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is 
owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise. 
In laying down such a general two-step approach, the House of Lords ensured 
that further exceptions were established to the rule against recovery of 
economic loss. Moreover, it was only a matter of time before some future 
case did away with the rule entirely. 
That case was Junior Books Ud. v. Veitchi Co.29 in which the House 
of Lords pushed the gates to recovery for economic loss wide open: the 
exception consumed the rule. In short, it did away with the requirement of 
damage to person or property and made the existence of damaged property 
sufficient to trigger tortious liability. The pertinent facts .were that, during 
the construction of a factory, a sub-contractor negligently laid a defective 
floor. There was no contract between the sub-contractor and the factory owner. 
Although there was no danger to anyone or anything, the owner decided to 
have the floor relaid at a cost of $100,000. During the work, a further $300,000 
in expenses was incurred due to lost production. The House of Lords held 
that recovery of the entire $400,000 was appropriate. While it refused to treat 
pure economic loss as a unique category of loss, the precise basis on which 
it did this was not entirely clear. 
Undoubtedly, the parties were in a chain of close contractual relationships, 
but they lacked any privity between themselves. As such, they easily met 
28 [1978] A.C. 728. 
29 [1983] I A.C. 520. 
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the requirements for an established duty based upon neighbourhood, special 
relationship or proximity. However, the key question was the substance and 
scope of such a duty. While it could simply amount to a duty to perform a 
service in a non-negligent manner, it might also entail a general duty to all 
neighbours to meet any reasonable (contractual) expectations. Whichever it 
was, such extensive recovery in tort would significantly undermine the 
significance of contiguous contractual relationships between parties. The 
plaintiff would be able to insist on compensation from the defendant even 
when the defendant may not have lmown that the plaintiff bad special demands 
or that there was no risk of physical injury to the plaintiff. Mindful of Brandon's 
dissenting words on the wisdom of enforcing a transmissible warranty of 
quality, there seemed little future reason to bother with the law of contract 
when contractual expectancies could be enforced through tort law.30 
The English courts' response to Junior Books was decidedly swift and 
negative. In a series of cases, it managed to undermine and cabin the decision 
without the House of Lords actually bringing itself to effect a fmmal overruling. 
In Caparo v. Dickman, 3•1 auditors were found not liable to investors for 
misinformation published in a company's annual report. As the information 
was never given to the plaintiffs with their specific transaction in mind, there 
could be no general duty to neighbours based on foreseeability: the duty. only 
existed to those in proximity. Likewise, in Murphy v. Brentwood District 
Councii32 a municipality was held to owe no duty to a home owner when an 
inspector failed to find defects in the home's foundations. The House of Lords 
decided that the loss was purely economic and was more appropriately dealt 
·with under contract, not tort. Recovery for pure economic loss was thus restricted 
to situations of close party proximity which are tantamount to contract 
relationships. Consequently, after a decade of development, English courts have 
reverted to the traditional rule of no recovery for economic loss, but they are 
occasionally prepare.cl to recognize well-establishe.d exceptions, as in the case 
of negligent statements. 
Canadian courts have been less doctrinaire and more pragmatic. In Central 
Trust Co. v. Rafuse,33 the Supreme Court accepted that liability can arise 
from a contractual or tortious basis. However, where a contract existed, the 
contract would govern any tort liability. Consequently, there is no reason to 
preclude recovery of economic loss in tort based on the argument that the 
loss belongs to the law of contract. Moreover, in Kamloops v. Nielson34 and 
AG. of Ontario v. Fatehi35, the Supreme Court expressed grave doubts about 
30 Ibid. at 551. For further discussion of Junior Book's implications, see infra, pp. 304-305. 
31 [1990] 2 W.L.R. 358. 
32 [1990] 3 W.L.R. 414. 
33 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147]. 
34 (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (S.C.C.). 
35 (1984), 31 C.C.L.T. l. 
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the continuing applicability of Rivtow in light of tbe decision in Anns. In its 
most recent decision in C.N.R. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. 36, a majority 
of the Supreme Court held that Canadian courts should follow Kamloops and 
Anns despite the recent decision of the House of Lords in Murphy. Pure 
economic loss is prima facie recoverable when there is sufficient proximity 
between the defendant's negligent act and the plaintiffs foreseeable loss; 
there will be no liability where policy so dictates. Notwithstanding a vigorous 
dissent along English lines, recovery was allowed for pure economic loss as 
a result of damage to a third party's property. 
"WHO IS MY NEIGHBOUR?" 
In both the English and Canadian contexts, it seems clear (at least for the 
time being) that the courts have abandoned Lord Atkin's search for some 
golden thread that will make general sense of the law's particulars. They 
have opted for a less doctrinaire and more pragmatic approach to tort law. 
In the graphic words of Purchas, there is "no precedent for the application 
of strict logic in treading the path leading from the general principle established 
in Donoghue v. Stevenson towards the Pandora's Box of unbridled damages 
at the end of the path of foreseeability. " 37 Although each begin from different 
starting-points, the English and Canadian courts are stranded on the same 
adjoining and treacherous ground. Each are motivated by the need to allow 
recovery for economic loss in some contexts, but to deny it in others. In 
plotting this path, the challenge for the courts has been to map out a network 
of intersections and turnings that can be rationally defended and intellectually 
justified within the law's own frame of reference. Without the demonstration 
of such an internal or immanently rational account, any theoretical attempt 
to preserve the distinctiveness of law from politics is fatally compromised. 
This analytical confusion and doctrinal chaos is nowhere more apparent 
than in the general judicial debate that centres on 'the duty of care'. While the 
existence of a duty tends to be the pivotal question in most cases, it takes on 
special significance and salience in economic loss cases. Under Do1Wghue, an 
obligation to talce reasonable care is owed by everyone to their neighbours and 
is based upon a general duty of reasonable foreseeability. But, in Hedley Byrne 
situations, where loss is economic and not physical, a plaintiff can only recover 
economic loss when there is a special relationship with the defendant of reliance 
and proximity: the duty is more restrictive because of the fear that liability for 
negligent misstatements would be more difficult to determine than negligent 
acts. Hence, a different duty question was asked depending on whether a defendant 
bad engaged in a negligent mis-statement (e.g. a service) or a negligent act 
36 (1992), 91 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (S.C.C.). 
37 Greater Nottingham Co-operative v. Cementa/ion, [1988} 3 W.L.R. 396 at 407. See, also, 
Caparo, supra, note 30 at 362-5 per Lord Bridge, 374 per Lord Roskill and 379-Sl per Lord 
Oliver. 
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(e.g. a manufactured produ.ct); pure economic loss was recoverable in the former, 
but not the latter. In an ironic tum, advocates of a "no recovery for economic 
loss" rule now argue that liability for negligent acts is more uncontrollable than 
for negligent mis-statements: the same fear that caused the Hedley Byme judges 
to make negligent mis-statements distinct from negligent acts. The doctrinal 
device used to implement and police this distinction is "proximity". Whereas 
the Donoghue formula looks to whether the loss was a foreseeable consequence 
of the negligent act, proximity does not impose an obligation unless there is 
an awareness by the defendant that it has assumed a risk, voluntarily exercised 
a skill or knows that the plaintiff is relying on the defendant. 
Contrary to judicial belief, proximity is not all that it is cracked up to 
be. Although disguised as a rule, a test, a matter of fact, it is an empty vessel 
that can be filled with whatever concoction that its user desires: only 
interpretation can infuse it with meaning. The idea of there being any definitive 
or determinate difference between 'foreseeability' and 'proximity' is entirely . 
illusory. It is based on a set of normative values about what obligations ought 
to be owed between people: it is nothing more than an attempt to draw a 
line based on a value choice. At some point, courts will want to draw a line, 
but efforts to disguise proximity as an analytical rather than a political device 
give it an aura of objectivity that it does not deserve. The motive force, we 
are told in Murphy, behind this pretence is the felt need not to infringe on 
the ground of contract law. 38 
In Murphy, the House of Lords chose to depart from its earlier judgment 
in Anns. The eulogies that have been written for that departed decision disagree 
over whether the law has been thrust into a state of uncertainty or whether 
it can continue along the same meny path as before.39 However, both can 
lay some claim to the truth. Murphy may have formulated a new test, but 
the test lacks determinate meaning unless the implicit values which have 
taken law from Anns to Murphy by way of Junior Books are made explicit. 
The Law Lords have marched to the top of the hill and marched down again, 
but have they really gone anywhere? The formal appearances of Anns and 
Murphy may look different, but their reasonable application does not demand 
any different substantive outcome. 
The Anns approach was used to expand liability in negligence for 
economic loss and reached its zenith in Junior Books. The later Canadian 
cases are certainly no retreat from this approach.40 Its two-step approach 
collapsed all sorts of issues into the fust part of the test in asking whether 
there was sufficient proximity or neighbourhood between the plaintiff and 
38 For discussion of the pretence, see infra, "Contorted Relations". 
39 See Schlosser, supra, note 11 at 673-700; MacQueen, "The Future of Liability for Defective 
Buildings" (1990) 44 Scots Law Times 337. 
40 See Kamloops, supra, note 34; Just v. B. C., [1989 j 2 S.C.R. 1228; and Rothfield v. Manolalws, 
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1259, and Norsk, supra, note 36. 
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the defendant such that the actions of the defendant would likely cause harm 
to the plaintiff.41 The second part of the test is extremely vague in its general 
reference to policy considerations, and it simply asks in a more open fashion 
to re-visit the factors that are implied in answetjng the first part. 
The first step of the Anns test can be .equafe4· with proximity, but, in 
addition, the damage must be a "reasonably foreseeable" consequence. Hence, 
a duty exists not merely to those with whom a defendant has a proximate 
or special relationship, but also to all those in the defendant's neighbourhood. 
The limits in the second step are optional. Anns uses the language from both 
Donoghue's neighbourhood test and Hedley Byrne's special relationship test. 
The distinction that was first drawn in Hedley Byrne may collapse under 
Anns. It is not always clear on what basis the courts have allowed or denied 
recovery. In Ross v. Caunters, it was stated that "the basis of the solicitor's 
liability to others is either an extension of Hedley Byrne or, more probably, 
a direct application of the principle of Donoghue v. Stevenson."42 Also, while 
many contend that Donoghue is not extended by the duty imposed through 
Hedley Byrne,43 the wording of the Anns test can and has, as in Junior Books, 
sanctioned the "extension" of Hedley Byrne into the field of defective products. 
The language which is used in applying the Anns test is important. In 
discussing the complexities of liability for economic loss, it was noted that: 
... the courts of this country will continue to search for reasonable and workable 
limits to the liability of a negligent supplier of manufactured products or services, 
to the liability of a negligent contractor for contractual undertakings owed to 
others, and to the liability of persons who negligently make misrepresentations. 
In this search courts will be vigilant to protect the community from damages 
suffered by a breach of the "neighbourhood" duty.44 
This reference to neighbourhood sounds much more expansive than the notion 
of proximity and it should be obvious that the Anns proximity or neighbourhood 
test can easily capture all the neighbourhood relationships circumscribed in 
Donoghue. Proximity is, therefore, meaningless without discussion of the values 
and policy choices which energise these cases and operationalise its application. 
Murphy and Anns merge together as formal tests; it is the values given weight 
in a case that ultimately decide whether there is proximity or neighbourhood. 
Although proximity appears to be a more precise description of a duty 
relationship than neighbourhood or reasonable foreseeability, it is not "a 
definable concept but merely a description of circumstances.' '45 It is impossible 
to determine the issue of duty without reference to a whole host of other 
41 See Anns, supra, note 28 at 751 per Lord Wilberforce. 
42 Ross v. Caunters, [1979] 1 A.C. 193 at 199 per Sir Robert Megarry V.C. 
43 Rivtow Marine, supra, note 27 at 1210-11 per Ritchie J. and Junior Books, supra, note 29 
at 207 per Lord Keith. J 
44 B.D.C. Ltd. v. Ho/strand Fanns Ltd. (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 12-13 per Estey J. 
45 Caparo, supra, note 30 .at 379 per Lord Oliver. 
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concepts and considerations. As a test, Murphy proximity gives no more 
direction than the Anns duty test. Both collapse policy issues into the duty 
st.age of an analysis and thus disguise other issues. Proximity can just as 
easily expand or restrict liability as Anns. It is amorphous and can be used 
to support all manner of results. Although proximity is held out as being 
analytically and functionally different, it is ultimately a re-vamped Anns test. 
It is a catch-all phrase. Hinting at an idea of remoteness or causation, it is 
more encompassing than that.46 It is simply another conceptual. rug that is 
weaved together out of public policy and foreseeability. As such, it is no 
different than Anns in its potential scope and manipulability. Indeed, in Murphy 
there was considerable concern for what were essentially policy issues, such 
as the transmissible warranty problem, a desire to limit liability for municipal 
authority, and deference to legislative action. The problem with Anns was 
that it had been used to incorporate policies into tort law that put the Murphy 
court into apoplexy. Murphy overturns Anns to discredit the val.ues which 
have become synonymous withAnns. However, although Murphy's proximity 
is linked more to the understanding that law should proceed cautiously,47 
there is no reason why it could not accommodate the same val.ues and policy 
choices as Anns. 
LINES IN THE SAND 
Predictably, therefore, tort doctrine is a haphazard collection of dead-ends and 
cul-de-sacs. It is our contention that the law does not presently nor can it in 
the future achieve an internally consistent or formally satisfying account of 
its own existence or development. It is destined to remain a hodge-podge of 
half-baked distinctions and superficial. categorisations. As Simpson puts it, 
"since al.I questions about liability for negligence are supposed to tum on the 
doctrine of the duty of care, one must expect the duty of care to be something 
of a dog's breakfast. " 48 The doctrinal product is more a result of political 
expediency than of technical soundness: its rudimentary predictability is only 
accessible and comprehensible in light of extra-legal. considerations. The sham 
distinction between reasonable foreseeability and proximity is only one of the 
more general and blatant examples of a pervasive trend throughout the law. 
In the area of economic loss in tort, the courts rely on an array of distinctions 
whose plausibility and cogency are profoundly suspect. It must be remembered 
that it is not enough to point out differences between two activities or 
46 University of Regina v. Pettick, (1991) 77 D.L.R. (4th) 615 at 632 per Sherstobitoff J.A. 
47 See, Council of the Shire of Sutherland v. Heyman (1985), 157 C.L.R. 424 at 481 per Brennan 
J.: "It is preferable ... that the law should develop novel categories of negligence incrementally 
and by analogy with established categories, rather than by a massive extension of a primae facie 
duty of care restrained only by indefinable considerations which ought to negate, or to reduce 
or limit the scope of the duty or the class of persons to whom it is owed." 
48 A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1975) 
at 325. 
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characteristics; that distinction must be sufficient to warrant the difference in 
legal treatment that is purported to result. For instance, while there is a obvious 
difference between blue-eyed and brown-eyed plaintiffs, it is not the kind of 
difference that can support or warrant completely different legal treatment in 
matters of tortious liability. In short, the difference must be related in some 
relevant and justifiable way to the purpose for making such a distinction. 
In attempting to explain and justify the different treatment that is and 
ought to be accorded to the tortious recovery of 'pure economic loss', the 
Anglo-Canadian courts have fallen back on at least nine separate, although 
often combined, arguments. None of these arguments can carry, either 
individually or collectively, the kind of justificatory weight that they are 
expected to. Indeed, they all tend to snap under serious scrutiny. Moreover, 
while in some cases the courts place almost determinative weight on a particular 
argument. they brush it aside in other cases when its effect is inconvenient 
or undesired. These arguments are: 
that economic loss is different from physical damage: Although it has 
been roundly condemned as being incapable of justification "on any intelligible 
principle, " 49 this distinction still plays a strong role in modem negligence 
law. Yet it is surely the case that all injuries are obliged to be quantified in 
monetary terms and, therefore, damages are reducible to financial losses. 
From the plaintiffs' point of view, no matter how the injuries are suffered 
or classified, they will still only receive compensation that is calculated and 
made on an economic basis. Moreover, treating economic loss differently 
from physical damage means that some equally negligent defendants will be 
less vulnerable to tortious claims than others simply becau~e of the kind of 
damage that they cause; the banker and stofkbroker will have less incentive 
to take care than manufacturers and builders. As Denning concluded, "I ·cannot 
think that liability depends on the nature of the damage. " 50 
that "pure" economic loss is different from consequential economic loss: 
Tort law has always allowed the recovery of economic losses that are 
consequential on physical injury or property damage. Apart from the difficulty 
of making a clear characterization in some circumstances, as in Muirhead51 
it is not easy to understand how this difference should warrant an entirely 
different rule for each kind of damage. If economic loss resulting from damage 
done to property is recoverable, it seems to be drawing an extremely fine line 
49 Hedley Byrne, supra, note 24 at 517 per Lord Devlin. 
so Candler v. Crane, Christmas, [1951] 2 K.B. 164 at 179. 
St Muirhead v. Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd., [1985] 3 All E.R. 705. The principle of 
non-recovery for pure economic loss flowing from damaged property is forcefully reiterated in 
Murphy, supra, note 32 at 426 per Lord Keith: "The jump that is here made from liability under 
the Donoghue v. Stevenson principle for damage to person or property caused by a latent defect 
in a carelessly manufactured article to liability for the cost of rectifying a defect in such an 
article which is ex hypothesi no longer latent is difficult to accept." 
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to deny recovery for other types of economic loss such as the diminished 
value of goods or buildings with latent defects, profits not realized due to 
damaged property or the cost of repairs for defective property. The term 'pure' 
is dismissive and unfairly conjures up notions of undeserving plaintiffs. 
Moreover, consequential loss remains also an economic loss as much as a 
property loss. After all, "it is in his [or her] pocket., not in his [or her] person 
that (the plaintiff) has suffered" .52 Presumably, while the loss is no less different 
to the plaintiff, the fact that the plaintiffs ownership of the power cable in 
Spartan Steel might have made all the difference to its recovery is ludicrous. 
that economic loss must be consequential on damage to the plaintiff's 
property or person and not to that of a third party: As the majority in 
Norsk stated, the fact that the injured party is a third party should not be a 
barrier to recovery if it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the 
third party could be injured. The argument against allowing recovery by third 
parties is akin to the argument in contract law that third parties generally 
cannot sue or be sued under a contract to which they are not a party. But, · 
as Donoghue clearly decided, contract arguments do not apply in tort or carry 
the same weight. Moreover, the problem is more one of remoteness than of 
duty. While the rules for remoteness give a determinate array of answers, 
they do at least point to a more fitting agenda of questions to be asked. 
that statements are different from acts: The origin of the distinction is 
from Hedley Byrne itself. Lord Reid stated that acts must be treated differently 
from statements because acts cause only one incident of damage, but statements 
can cause many.53 Also, statements give rise to economic losses rather than 
physical injuries. Hence, a closer, more proximate relationship had to exist 
for the recovery of economic loss for a negligently given statement, a 
relationship which was described as equivalent to contract. 54 Yet the difference 
between acts and statements is more apparent than real. A statement is surely 
only one kind of act: to cry 'fire' in a crowded theatre is as much an act as 
a statement (as is the failure to do so). As cases like Ross show,55 the courts 
are far from consistent or clear in deciding whether a particular occurrence 
involves a statement or an act. Furthermore, a statement can cause extensive 
physical injury, as in Clayton,56 and an act can result in considerable economic 
loss, as in Dutton. 57 The courts have not hesitated to impose liability when 
52 Cooke, "An Impossible Distinction" (1991), 107 L.Q.R. 46 at 50. Perhaps property loss 
. should not be protected by tort at all as it too is a financial interest better governed by contract . 
or insurance. See Abel, "Should Tort Law Protect Property against Accidental Loss?" in Furmston, 
supra, note 37 at 155. 
53 Hedley Byrne, supra, note 24 at 483 per Lord Reid. 
54 Ibid. at 530 per Lord Devlin. 
55 Ross, supra, note 42. 
56 Clayton v. Woodman & Sons, [1961] 3 All E.R. 249 (Q.B.). 
57 Dutton v. Bognor Regis U.D.C., [1972] 1 Q.B. 373. 
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negligent statements have led to property damage or personal injury. In Robson, 
the defendant was liable for injuries sustained when its employee advised 
the plaintiff to step back and, in doing so, caused the plaintiff. to fall off a 
stage.58 Accordingly, in cases where there is physical harm, it is not the fact 
that injury resulted from a statement that is considered important, but the 
fact that there was physical harm irrespective of whether it resulted from a 
statement or an act. 
that the negligent performance of services is different from the negligent 
manufacture of products: Provided the parties are in a suitably proximate 
relationship, pure economic loss is generally recoverable for the negligent 
performance of services, but not the negligent manufacture of goods. 
Consequential economic loss would usually be recoverable for both. The 
artificiality of the distinction is clearly revealed in Pettick,59 which concerns 
negligence by architects. The majority characterizes the case as a negligent 
service case rather than a builder's liability case in order to bring it within 
the ambit of Hedley Byrne and allow recovery for economic loss from negligent 
misstatement. Yet, as the dissent points out, careless design is not recoverable 
as it is a function of manufacturing rather than a professional service. The 
majority's argument is rather strained, but it is forced to do so because of 
the non-recovery rule on pure economic loss for defects and manufactured 
goods. Similarly, in Rivtow Marine,60 the Court circumvented the rule against 
recovery for design defects by the imposition of a duty to warn which brought 
the claim under Hedley Byrne. The plaintiff received lost profits that resulted 
from the failure to warn, but not those that resulted from the need to repair. 
Again, the distinction produced an illogical and confusing result. 
It is contended that the rule of no recovery for economic loss still applies 
for products because recovery in such circumstances ought to be an issue of 
contractual warranty.61 Whatever merit this important distinction may have 
had histOrically, it is impossible to defend in a modem and complex economy 
in which the service and manufacturing sectors are inseparable. In a great 
many service cases, there are contractual obligations. Issues of contract are 
considered in those service cases which permit recovery of economic loss in 
tort. Consequently, if the supremacy of contract is important, the same rule 
can apply for both manufactured products and services. Indeed, there would 
no longer be a rationale to treat manufacturing differently than service 
industries. Manufactured goods and buildings are not made without the 
provision of information, services and advice. It would be anomalous that 
58 Robson v. Chrysler Corporation (Canada) (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 49 (Alta. C.A.). 
59 See Pettick, supra, note 46. 
60 Rivt~w Marine, supra, note 27. 
61 Murphy, supra, note 32 at 425 per Lord Keith, at 435 per Lord Bridge, at 447 per Lord 
Oliver. 
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the negligent perfonnance of a service would give rise to tortious liability 
for pure economic loss,62 but the actual construction would not.63 
The line between services and manufacturing is especially blurred by 
subsequent judicial treatment of Junior Books. In Murphy, it is suggested 
that Junior Books is an extension of Hedley Byme.64 Presumably, the plaintiffs 
relied on the special skill of the defendants. However, this clearly mixes the · 
supposed distinction between manufacturing and information services. Junior 
Books is also a manufacturing case, and the judgments illustrate that the 
Lords considered the defendant's liability to be rooted in the principles of 
Donoghue rather than Hedley Byrne. Consequently, this difference is more 
confusing than it is useful. · 
that recovery for economic loss will open the floodgates to indeterminate 
liability: This constant concern is summed up by Cardozo' s oft-quoted 
statement that liability for pure economic loss might result " in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. " 65 Contrary to 
received wisdom, there is no indication that such a fear is any greater in 
economic loss cases than in other negligence cases. While it is true that " the 
scope of liability for economic loss is potentially breathtaking, "66 so are the 
consequences in human and economic terms that can flow from disasters like 
Bhopal or the Amico Cadiz. In those cases where liability was denied, the 
liability was far from indeterminate and not a real factor in the disposal of 
the cases: there is usually, as in Murphy, an obvious and easily calculable . 
measure of damages; there is a fairly typical lapse of time between the negligent 
act and the economic loss and, as in Junior Books, it can be very brief; and 
there is usually, as in Simaan and Greater Nottingham Co-operative Society> 
an identifiable and limited class of potential defendants. Consequently, while 
too expansive liability is always a problem to be guarded against in tort, the 
potential for indeterminate liability in economic loss is insufficient on its own 
to warrant special treatment. 
The defendanf s lack of knowledge of risk and its potential liability to a class 
of undefinable plaintiffs are at the core of the concern over expansive liability. 
TheAbramovic and Three Mile Island cases are examples where the defendant's 
actions impacted on a wide number of people who had no necessary connection 
to the defendant apart from the accidents in question.67 Courts can clearly deny 
these claims, either because the defendant could not have foreseen that the 
plaintiff would be injured, or because the damages suffered were too remote. 
62 Pettick, supra, note 46 and Smith v. Bush, (1990] A.C. 831. 
63 Department of Environment v. Bates, [19901 2 All E.R. 943. 
64 Murphy, supra, note 32 at 427 per Lord Keith. 
65 Ultramares Corp. v. ToucM, 225 N.Y. 170 (1931). 
66 Pettick, supra, note 46 at 632. 
°' Abramovic v. C.P. Lta., (1992) 6 O.R. (3d) 1 and Genual Public Utilities v. GI.ass Kitche!IS 
of Lancaster, 542 A. 2d 567 (1988). 
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liability since the plaintiff had a proprietary interest in the building that was 
destroyed and the defendant should have known that someone would have such 
a proprietary interest.68 In Caltex and Norsk, ·although the plaintiffs were 
compensated for costs incurred, the defendants did'not have actual knowledge 
of the plaintiffs. A similar logic can be applied to Spartan Steel - if a loss of 
profits on the first two melts was foreseeable, so was the loss on the third melt. 
In short, the available, albeit indeterminate, concepts of causation, duty and 
remoteness are as capable (or incapable) of dealing with the 'floodgates' 
dimensions of economic loss cases as with any other area of law. 
that recovery for economic loss will result in uncertain liability: Uncertainty 
results from a lack of knowledge about legal liabilities, risks and potential 
plaintiffs. Broad-and expansive liability flows from this uncertainty. This 
uncertainty is a direct consequence of a legal doctrine that has no clear position 
on economic loss that it is prepared to justify or stand by. For example, the 
doctrine emanating from the House of Lords in Caparo cannot possibly be 
consistent with Smith v. Bush. Thus, mindful of the uncertainty in other 
areas of law and that the remedy for such a state of affairs is arguably in the 
hands of the judges themselves, there is no good reason why liability should 
be denied simply because of an uncertainty created by constant doctrinal fluxes 
in law. It is a classic bootstrap argument and ought to be dismissed as such. 
that recovery for 'pure' economic loss ls more appropriately handled by 
contract: It is forcefully contended that it is essential to preserve the 
distinction between tort and contract. Once tort begins to infiltrate too freely 
into contract, "the world of commerce would be intolerable" and it would 
make a "mockery of contractual negotiations. " 69 The judges offer no empirical 
68 Oakville Storage v. C.N.R. (1990), 80 D.L.R. (4th) 675. The concept of "stranger" appears 
to be sufficient to deny recovery in the United States. Stranger cases occur where the defendant 
had no reasonable knowledge that its negligent actions would affect a plaintiff. In Dundee Cement 
Co. v. Chemical Laboratories, 712 F.2d 1166 (1983), a truck overturned and blocked the only 
entrance to a cement plant and this accident caused business loss for the cement plant. The 
court denied liability for the trucker since it would lead to "crushing, virtually open-ended 
liability." In Aikens v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 348 Pa. Super 17, 501 A.2d 277 (1985) 
at 278-279, the employees of a factory lost wagf3 from a train derailment that closed the plant. 
The claim was dismissed as the defendant had no knowledge of a contract between the factory 
and the employees. The rhetoric in this case is particularly telling. The claim "would create an 
undue burden upon industrial freedom of action" and would "pose a danger to our economic 
system." See generally, Lieder, "Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic 
Loss: Building on Cardozo and Coase" (1991) 66 Wash. L. Rev. 937. 
69 Weller v. Foot and Mouth Institute, [1966) 1 Q.B. 569 per Widgery J. and Simaan, [1988) 
2 W.L.R. 761. See, also, Candlewood, [1986) 1 A.C. l at 15 and The Aliakmon, 816-17 per 
Lord Brandon. For early sightings of an exclusionary rationale based on inappropriate interference 
with the proper sphere of contracts, see J. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 6th ed., (Sydney: Law 
Book Company, 1983) at 164, and Stevens, "Negligent Acts Causing Pure Financial Loss: Policy 
Factors at Work" (1973) 23 U. of Toronto. L.J. 431 at 455. 
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support for such predicted cat.astropbic consequences and fail to provide at 
general defence of the initial compartmentalisation of civil obligations aI 
the traditional categorisation of economic loss as a head of contractual damag 
Furthermore, it is conveniently overlooked that the original reason for tl 
birth of modern negligence law through Donoghue v. Stevenson was the failm 
of contract law to respond equitably to the injustices created by an inflexib! 
application of the privity doctrine. In light of this, it seems particularl 
wrong-beaded to attempt to base a rule for tortious recovery, as in Hedle 
Byrne, on the existence of "a relationship equivalent to contract."70 Moreove1 
while the courts have used, the mere existence of a relevant contract to deff 
tortious liability, as in D. & F. Estates, they have not, as in Hedley Byrne. 
held to this consistently. Accordingly, rather than expect parties to plot ; 
course through a complicated maze of different contracts, it would be mon 
efficient, fair and conducive to good business practice to allow the part) 
who suffered economic loss to sue directly the party who negligently caused 
that loss. 
In Rivtow, the Court was concerned about the imposition of contractual 
warranties and standards into a products liability case in tort. This relates to 
the idea that pure economic loss concerns expectancy values, lost profits and 
normal business risks: the plaintiff is attempting to recover for having received 
something less than what it expected. While contract law is the usual protector 
of expectancy values,71 the courts have been prepared in other tort cases to 
allow recovery for such losses in circumstances where the loss is almost 
speculative in nature. In Ross, a beneficiary was able to recover for a lost 
inheritance that he placed no reliance upon nor even knew that be had, let 
alone expected.72 
that recovery for 'pure' economic loss can only be effected by legislative 
initiative: It is a common ploy by the courts to insist that such large-scale 
changes in the law are not properly within the jurisdiction of the courts. In 
economic loss cases, the argument is made that, as it involves consumer 
protection and gives rise to difficulty in circumscribing the precise ambit of 
liability, the matter should be left to legislatures. The role of the courts is 
not to engage in open-ended policy-making. As such, recovery for "pure" 
economic loss cannot be maintained or defended as an act of principled judicial 
decision-making.73 Again, such an argument is only selectively deployed by 
70 Hedley Byme, supra, note 24 per Lord Devlin. 
71 The issue of the relation between contract and tort will be discussed at length infra, pp. 
297-301. Itsb.ould be noted here, however, that not everyone holds that the protection of expectancy 
interests is the role of contract Jaw. See P. Aliyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) at 754-64. 
72 Ross, supra, note 42. 
73 See Murphy, supra, note 32 at 419 per Lord Mackay, 432 per Lord Keith, 451 per Lord 
Oliver, and 457 per Lord Jauncey. 
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the courts. A deference to legislative intervention belies the reality that courts 
have been the ufost active fora for the imposition of liability for economic 
loss. Further, legislation is often silent on the question of civil liability and 
it is for the courts to determine its existenre. The extension of liability in, 
for instance, Donoghue and Kamloops belies the courts' integrity in relying 
on this argument. It could equally be argued that the decision to overturn 
Anns after 13 years of accepted docuinal existence is no less an act oflegislative 
usurpation. This judicial conservatism simply tries to under-play its reliance 
on policy values in making a decision. There is the perception that an appeal 
to authority is more legitimate than an appeal to policy. Yet ultimately, it is 
the policy questions which drive the use of the authority. 
In assessing and dismissing the cogency of these arguments, the objective 
has not been to build a case for the acceptance of recovery for pure economic 
loss into tort doctrine. There may indeed be persuasive reasons for excluding 
such liability at any particular point in time. Our point is that the legal arguments 
relied upon by the courts are not compelling in and of themselves: they do 
not comprise a convincing account of why recovery for pure economic loss 
resulting from negligent acts ought to be treated differently from other instances 
of tortious liability. Nor do internal accounts that, while going beyond the 
doctrinal arguments actually used, attempt to explain the courts' behaviour 
by the formal struggle over the nature of adjudication as a restrained practice 
of principle rather than a broad exercise in policy-making.74 However, this 
conclusion does not mean that some account cannot be given of the courts' 
reasons for attempting to effect such an exclusionary manoeuvre. But, if there 
is any semblance of order or logic to the courts' chaotic and transparent 
efforts to make such doctrinal distinctions, it will be found in the larger social 
context that frames and intrudes upon the legal and judicial enterprise. It is 
to the historico-political forces that comprise that informing context and the 
ideological visions through which they are articulated that we now turn. 
DOUBLE VISION 
In seeking to establish the terms and conditions for collective life, societies 
must inevitably engage in the normative struggle between competing social 
visions. One important site for the ceaseless negotiation of this visionary 
conflict is the courts. Behind every doctrinal body of law, there stands a 
social vision that gives it life and meaning. As such, all lawyers and judges 
must possess a framework of ideas that help them grasp the past tradition of 
political ordering, the nature of present reality, the possibilities for future 
action, and the justifications for these understandings. As Duncan Kennedy 
puts it, "we are divided, among ourselves and also within ourselves, between 
irreconcilable visions of humanity and society, and between radically different 
74 See Peldthusen, supra, .note 10 at 369. 
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aspirations for our common future. "75 Accordingly, the law of civil obligations 
is an extended conversation about the kind of society and individuals that 
people want to be. It concerns the institutional arrangement and substantive 
distribution of authority and power in the manifold relations between state, 
society and individuals. 
More often implicit than explicit, these visions are the sustaining poetry 
of legal doctrine: they energise and animate the prosaic routines of economic 
and social life.76 Social visions structure perception and prescription. They 
inhabit the twilight zone between pure normative abstractions and historically 
verifiable assertions. Although largely .mythic in source and simplicity, they 
order reality and become part of our lived experience and self-understanding. 
By mediating the actual and the ideal, these visions of private ordering 
simultaneously empower and limit the political imagination. As such, they 
not only carry strong explanatory force, they also wield significant moral 
authority. While they resonate with utopian echoes, they are meant to convey 
a sense of the attainable and the realistic in historical experience. To affirm 
a particular vision is to accept a basic epistemology, a social theory and a 
human psychology. That vision commits its adherents to a whole host of 
foundational premises, insights and intuitions about the human condition and 
its potentialities. 
While they often seem self-contained and exhaustive, these social visions 
are necessarily incomplete and not mutually exclusive. They are selective in 
emphasis and embrace. It is their raison d'etre to comprise an accessible 
distillation of the historical and aspirational elements of our collective and 
personal lives. Because of their generality and aphoristic nature, they often 
lead to contradictions between visionary intimations and existential practices 
and result in incoherences among commonplace patterns of behaviour.77 
Consequently, the doctrinal practice is not always the child of the visionary 
parent. Nevertheless, although they are indete1minate iil the guidance they 
offer, these visions do push in definite ideological directions and dictate a 
particular setting of the doctrinal agenda. 
In the judicial arena, an appreciation of these visions' role and operation 
is essential to any effort to comprehend the development and of constitutional 
doctrine. Without such generative visions, legal reasoning would be reduced 
to a desultory game of catch-as-catch-can; the normative dimension of law 
would be lost. There are many different visions at work in the formulation 
and interpretation of legal doctrine. Legal actors are divided among and within 
75 See Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685. 
76 See H. Steiner, Moral Argument and Social Vision in the Modem Tort Law of Accidents 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987). 
77 See M. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (London: Methuen, 1962) at 123-25 and R. Unger, 
Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
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themselves about the appeal and efficacy of different visions of constitutional 
order. Accordingly, legal doctrine is not a reflected embodiment of one 
indwelling and sufficient vision, but is the formal site for the attempted, but 
elusive, blending and reconciliation of competing visions.78 The temporary 
accommodations made are more a result of political expediency than moral 
purity. Although one vision may tend to dominate and infuse the law with 
its guiding principles, competing visions will constantly challenge it and 
provide a debilitating set of counter-principles. At times, the tension will 
precipitate doctrinal crisis; at other times, the friction will be subdued and 
relatively untroubling. Yet, muted or manifest, this antagonism fuels and 
informs doctrinal development. 
The law of civil obligations is dominated by two central visions -
" individualist" and "communitarian" - that have vied for control of the 
legal imagination.79 The basic dynamic bas been the competition between 
social regulation and private freedom for normative primacy and organisational 
control. It is the way each vision balances centralised authority and individual 
autonomy that gives it its special ambience and character, not the exclusive 
preference for one over the other. Whereas individualism stops short of 
libertarian anarchism and the championing of entirely unregulated economic 
activity, communitarianism does not extend to state totalitarianism and the 
implementation of a wholly orchestrated economic scheme. Of course, neither 
vision is intrinsically better than the other. They are only good or bad in 
light of pre-existing visionary commitments or, as Holmes stated, "deep-seated 
preferences; " 80 there is no meta-vision available. In matters of social vision, 
the inarticulate poetry of the heart has the first and the final word. 
The central images of the individualist vision are state dis trust and 
individual liberty. It imagines a world consisting of independent and 
self-sufficient persons who confidently draw up and robustly pursue their 
own life-plans. Each individual bas a true moral and pre-social self, not 
contingently sculpted by the social milieu. Nonnative experience is private 
and does not lend itself to public reckoning; human fulfilment is a personal 
odyssey. Within such a society, freedom is achieved when people are treated 
as an end and not as a means to other people's ends. Society is never more 
78 For a general account of this process, see Hutchinson and Monahan, "The Rights Stuff: 
Roberto Unger and Beyond" (1984) 62 Texas L. Rev. 1477 at 1501-18. 
79 This is not to suggest that these two visions exhaust the universal possibilities for imagining 
the teml.S and conditions of collective life. However, it is claimed that they offer an adequate 
and defensible account of the historical basis and limits of civil obligation in Angle>-Canadian 
jurisdictions. In line with the fac~ that such visions mediate the ideal and the actual, the snapshots 
presented draw upon a wide range of raw material and sources. As such, they are synthetic 
images ·rather than pure abstractions of empirical sketches. For a more general explanation, see 
A. Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold: Critical Essays in Modem Legal Thought (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1988). 
80 0 . W. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921) at 312. 
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than the sum of the individual parts nor public morality more than a temporary 
coincidence of private values and preferences. The state facilitates freedom 
by imposing a minimum of formal and equal constraints upon people's 
activities. Society must approximate as closely as possible to a voluntary 
scheme of individual co-operation. Although the possibility or opportunity 
for fratemal association is not denied, it can only be a personal choice and 
can never become an integral feature of an individual's identity. Paternalism 
is to be studiously avoided in economic and political affairs. 
The main enemy of freedom is the state and the collective will. Its 
tendency to abuse power and hamper the heroic individual must be kept in 
constant check lest the irresistible slide down the totalitarian slope is allowed 
to begin. This demands a limited, but strong state that focuses and exhausts 
its energies and authority in efforts to facilitate the individual pursuit of 
personal life-plans. This means that it must uphold the crucial institutions of 
private property and contractual exchange. To do more is oppressive and to 
do less is anarchic. The state must protect a pre-political sphere of pure 
autonomy which does not depend for its existence or legitimacy upon the 
state. Standing above politics, it sets the parameters and standards for the 
competitive struggle between self-directing individuals. Of course, none of 
this is intended to sanction crass egotism. When people ought to be sensitive 
and generous to those less well-off than themselves, altruism is a matter of 
personal morality and not collectively-imposed obligation. This basic distrust 
of the state is matched by an equally strong trust and confidence in the 
capacity and willingness of individuals to make the "right" choices. As such, 
the individual vision offers no general standards by which to judge the 
substantive worth of individual or collective action. 
The central images of the communitarian vision are civic virtue, economic 
regulation and ordered govemment In contrast to the individualist vision, 
republicanism does not understand society as a crude aggregate of separate 
things, but as connected cells in a thriving organism. Individuals are not universal 
and abstract moral entities, but are situated within a local and concrete context; 
they are political beings with particular historical and social affiliations. In an 
Aristotelian conception, it is maintained that an individual who finds moral 
fulfillment outside the community is "either a beast or a god. " 81 As between 
people, there exists a sense of belonging and reciprocal responsibility for others. 
Rather than conceive of freedom as individual lic.ense, it construes it as 
freedom-as-order; individuals are only fully themselves when they act as secure 
citizens of the mature republic and as protected players in a balanced economy. 
Whereas the individualist vision imagines a freedom that is contractual in 
origin and static in nature, communitarianism looks to a more organic and 
dynamic understanding of freedom. Eschewing the idea of a collective 
consciousness or mystical Volkgiest, the community seeks to attain civic virtue 
81 Aristotle, Politics, ed. by E. Barker, (1968). 
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and economic harmony by the cultivation of a set of shared values to infuse 
public and private life with a common purpose and theme. The social whole 
is much greater and coherent than the haphazard aggregation of its individual 
parts. Social worth and self-esteem are embedded in and nourished by affective 
affiliations: "solidarity is the social side of love. "82 Personal liberty without 
public responsibility is, at best, hollow and unsatisfying; at worst, it is uncivil 
and corrupting. Instead of relying upon transcendent values and abstract 
rationality, the search for social justice is based upon a practical reason that is 
contextual and contingent in character. The notions of reason and tradition are 
thought of as mutually reinforcing, derivative and self-correcting; flights of 
metaphysical musing become hopelessly fanciful and indulgent. The economic 
goal is the stable establishment of a common good rather than the hectic pursuit 
of individual satisfaction. The political agora and the economic marketplace are 
not simply arenas for the confrontation of competing wills, but sit.es for the 
transcending of individual preferences in the search for a unified good. 
Despite the occasional and spirited insistence on visionary purity, the 
common law is characterized by confusion and contradiction. Although there 
are strong and traditional themes that run through its history, these themes 
are sufficiently checked and infiltrated by other influences that any thought 
of visionary integrity is historically inaccurate and idealistically flawed. 
Consequently, the hallmark of contemporary liberalism is not simply its attempt 
to reconcile the competing influences and appeal of the individualist and 
communitarian visions - this is a commonplace and inevitable task for any 
legal sub-order. Its contemporary character comes from the particular form 
that that attempted integration talces. Sensitive to the limitations and injustice 
of overweening reliance on an individualist vision, liberals have grappled to 
combine "the pursuit of individuality with sociality and membership in a 
community. " 83 The individualist and communitarian threads are intertwined 
throughout the historical tapestry of civil obligation's doctrinal development. 
They appear from case to case, from judgment to judgment, and occasionally 
within a single judgment. 
WALLS AND HANDS 
Whatever the particular concatenation of pressures that brought about its 
occurrence or the precise contours of its shape and effect, there bas clearly 
been a profound move in the ideological constitution of Western and Northern 
societies. In traditional terms, there bas been a move to the right: a 
Reagan-Thatcherite Revolution has taken its turn. Individual freedom is the 
marching order of the day and laissez-faire is its banner. There is an increased 
distrust of centralized economic planning and a related preference for a 
82 R. Unger, Law in Motkm Society (New York: The Free Press, 1976) at 206. 
83 See G. Gaus, The Modem liberal Theory of Man (New York: St Martin's Press. 1983) at 
3-4. 
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strengthened reliance upon the market as the prime reform for achieving 
allocative efficiency and distributional equity. Indeed, this contingent success 
is interpret.ed by some as the final triumph of liberalism and politics and 
capitalism in economics; a post-historical age is upon us. 84 As a matter of 
symbolic significance, the invisible hand of the Western market has pushed 
over the Berlin Wall of the Eastern State. 
In terms of visionary allegiance, there has been a shift away from a 
communitarian-centered account of social living to a more individualist-focused 
design. Mindful that a market economy still relies on particular kinds of 
institutional planning and public enfor~ment, the shift is more emphatic than 
paradigmatic. Nevertheless, it is largely uncontroversial to suggest that a move 
toward a more individualist vision of social organization is likely to have some 
strong implications for the doctrinal development of civil obligation. At its most 
general, it might be expected that there would be a general preference for 
promoting contract as the primary mode of incurring obligation to others and 
that there would be a corresponding loss of appetite for imposing liability through 
the less consensual device of tort law. Moreover, within contractual doctrine 
itself, there might be a greater willingness to make it conform more closely to 
the stripped-down logic of a market-based ethic. And this is precisely what has 
happened. The shift in general ideological orientation is manifested in the general 
structure and sweep of civil obligation's doctrinal development. 
In schematic terms, there bas been a definite realignment of reliance in 
the choice of legal principles and justificatory rhetoric. Over the last 10 years, 
contracts bas become the favoured child of civil obligation's family: tort bas 
blotted its copybook. Although it threatened to eclipse contract, tort has now 
been relegated to its more traditional role of filling in the gaps left by a 
robust application of contract law. Caveat emptor has been resurrected. It 
was not so much that contract was dead, but that it bad, like Elm Street's 
Freddie Kreuger, merely slunk off into the shadows to lick its wounds and 
to prepare for a fresh assault on the citadel of civil obligation. Moreover, 
contract bas itself been pared down so that it will comply more strictly to 
the dictates of this New Right Age. 
In contract, over the past 25 years, the courts have oscillated between 
different legal visions of civil obligation.85 In 1968, the traditional view 
predominat.ed. The marketplace was to be the exclusive site for competitive 
exchange and the elaboration of terms for such deals. The law's role was to 
facilitate voluntary agreements and give effect to consumers' sovereign cboice.86 
84 See F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the last Man (1991). For a critique of a market 
economy as one that excludes state regulation, see Hutchinson and Petter, "Private Wrong/Public 
Rights: The Liberal of the Charter" (1988) 38 U. of Toronto L.J. 278. 
85 See Adams and Brownsword, The Ideologies of Coruract law, ugal Studies at 205 and H. 
Collins, The Law of Contracts (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,1986). 
86 See Suisse Atlantique, (1967] I A.C. 36. 
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Clarity of expectation and security of transaction were its foundations. There 
was to be no after-the-fact ad hoc readjustment. However, in the 1970' s, courts 
began to look more intrusively behind the veneer of formal fairness and to 
evaluate the substantive justness of agreements reached. Unjust eruicbment was 
frowned upon and there was to be proportionality between the seriousness of 
the breach and the generosity of the remedy; good faith and equitable dealings 
were to be the guiding lights of this active intervention. 87 A few years later, 
the courts were back on the traditional track. Eschewing considerations of 
"sympathy and politics",88 the courts began to reaffirm the sanctity of 
party-autonomy and to question the pertinence of unconscionability.89 Today, 
cases like Walford v. Miles9° demonstrate that a forma1 and individualistic 
approach to contract is decidedly back in vogue: certainty and settled expectations 
are always to be preferred to the vagaries of good faith dealings. 
A parallel pattern is evident in tort law. As much as the 1970's and 
early 1980's saw the expansion of tort law, since 1982 there has been a clear 
retracing of those fateful steps. As Templeman dismissively put it in 1988, 
with Anns "negligence began to resemble the proposition that we are all 
neighbours now, Pharisees and Samaritans alike, that foreseeability is a 
reflection of hindsight and that for every mischance in an accident-prone 
world someone solvent must be liable in damages."91 Beginning with Junior 
Books, the courts have effected a radical retreat from a formidable position 
in which tort law threatened to eviscerate entirely the body of contract law. 
In a nutshell, if it had been acted upon, Junior Books would have inflicted 
fatal damage to the ailing doctrine of contractual privity: the common law 
of Abinger's ghost would have been exorcised completely. Nevertheless, as 
subsequent events have shown, the decision was an aspiration more than an 
achievement. 
The nature of the challenge that the courts faced, but chose not to meet, 
was clearly put by Roskill. In responding to the argument that recovery for 
the diminished value of the offending bottle of ginger beer should only sound 
in contract, he stated: 
I seem to detect in that able argument reflections of the previous judicial approach 
to comparable problems before Donog}we v. Stevenson was decided. That 
approach usually resulted in the conclusion that in principle the proper remedy 
lay in contract and not outside it. But that approach and its concomitant 
87 See Iloyds Bank Limited v. Bundy, [1975] Q. B. 326; Schroeder Publishing Company Limited 
v. Macaulay, [1974] 3 All E.R. 616. Of course, during this period there were also pockets of 
communitarian-based approaches to contractual relations. See, Hong Kong Fir Shipping Company 
Limited v. Kawasaki Kise Kaisha Limited, [1962) 2 Q.B. 71. 
88 Gibson v. Manchester City Council, (1978] 2 All E.R. 583 at 591 per Geoffrey Lane L.J. 
89 See Photo Production Limited v. Securicor Transport limited, (1980) A.C. 827, and Morgan 
v. National Westminster Bank limited, (1985) A.C. 687. 
90 [1992) 2 W.L.R. 174 (H.L.). 
91 C.B.S. Songs Limited v .. Amstrad P.L.C., [1988] 1 A.C. 1013. 
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philosophy ended in 1932 and for my part I should be reluctant to countenance 
its re-emergence some fifty years later in the instant case. I think today the 
proper control lies not in asking whether the proper remedy should lie in contract 
or ... tort, not in somewhat capricious judicial detennination whether a particular 
case falls on one side of the line or the other, not in somewhat artificial distinctions 
b etween physical and economic or financial loss when the two sometimes go 
together and sometimes do not ... , but in the first instance in establishing the 
relevant principles and then in deciding whether the particular case falls within 
or without those principles.92 
Under such a legal regimen, it would no longer be taken for granted 
that contract was the primary mode of imposing civil obligations or that, 
without the existence of a contract, people had no legal obligation to safeguard 
the economic interests of others. Indeed, the upshot of Junior Books might 
well have been that a plaintiff in tort could be better off than a similar plaintiff 
with a relevant contract. Warranties would run with the product: a subsequent 
purchaser of goods or services could have a broader and more effective range 
of legal rights and remedies than the original purchaser. In effect, the role 
of contract would be to vary existing tort duties. In a neat inversion of history, 
contract would become the polyfilla of the gaps in tort's general scheme of 
civil obligations. Manufacturers' liability would no longer rest on the 
fonnalistic dictates of contractual privity, but on the substantive demands of 
social justice. 
However, as bas now become apparent, there was a visionary change 
of heart and such a doctrinal transformation did not take place. Although 
never formally overruled, Junior Books has been exiled to the wilderness of 
single instances and its precedential writ runs no further than its own immediate 
and specific facts. Of course, the possibility of this move forward to the past 
was presaged by Lord Brandon in his assertive dissent in Junior Books. Only 
three years later, in 1985, Brandon had managed to persuade all his fellow 
judges in The Aliakmon to come over to his way of thinking.93 It is a judgment 
that t.aps into and articulates a distinctive vision of civil obligation that is as 
traditionally individualistic as Lord Roskill' s is progressively communitarian. 
After wrongly stating that liability in negligence had been restricted to instances 
of physical damage to persons or their property, Brandon cuts to the doctrinal 
chase and, invoking the spectres of both Buckmaster and Abinger, warns 
against the introduction of a ' transmissible warrant of quality' into the law:. 
The effect ... would be, in substance, to create, as between two persons who 
are not in any contractual relation with each other, obligations on one of those 
two persons to the other which are only really appropriate as between persons 
who do have such a relationship between them. 
92 Supra, note 29 at 545. These words, of course, offer only a very illusory critique. Roskill 
wrongly implies the existence of some level of fixed and fixable principles that can be resorted 
to to resolve the dispute. Like Ronald Dworkin, he only 'solves' the problem by hiding it at a 
higher level of abstraction; see R. Dworkin, Law's Empire, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986). 
93 The Alia/a11on, [1986] A.C. 785. 
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In the case of a manufacturer or distributor of goods, the position would 
be that [it) warranted to the ultimate user or consumer of such goods that they 
were as well designed, as merchantable and as fit for their contemplated purpose 
as the exercise of reasonable care could make them .... In my view, the imposition 
of warranties of this kind on one person in favol}r ,of another, when there is 
no contractual relationship between them, .is contrary ·lb any sound policy 
requirement. 94 · · 
By 1990, Murphy's septet of law lords left no doubt that Junior Books 
was the high water mark of civil obligation and, as latter-day Canutes in 
reverse, decreed that the doctrinal tide was to ebb forthwith. Liability ba.c;ed 
on anything like a 'transmissible warrant of quality' was to be strenuously 
resisted. In a series of opinions that speak sotto voce in visionary terms, 
there is an unmistakable determination to leave Junior Books beached high 
and dry among the historical sand-dunes of legal doctrine. As Keith put it, 
cases like Anns and Junior Books "introduced a new species of liability 
governed by a principle indeterminate in character but having the potentiality 
of covering a wide range of situations, involving chattels as well as property, 
in which it had never hitherto been thought that the law of negligence had 
any place."95 As such, Murphy set the judicial seal of visionary approval on 
the individualistic turn of doctrinal events. 
CONTORTED RELATIONS 
The traditional distinction between contract and tort law is based on simple 
and fundamental ideas that are attributable to the competing intimations of 
their visionary sources. Whereas contractual obligations are held to be 
voluntarily assumed by parties in an exchange relationship, tort duties are 
considered to be imposed by the function of law. Accordingly, in contract, 
rules bad to be developed to determine what amounts to valid consideration 
to bring contracts into existence, which representations are enforceable as 
part of the contract, and which parties are privy to the contractual arrangements. 
In contrast, as tort law imposes obligations that are not voluntarily assumed, 
it must engineer rules that determine the scope and substance of such 
obligations. As such, a contract is much more beholden to an individualist 
vision and tort to a more communitarian account of collective responsibility. 
Furthennore, it will also not be surprising that questions of concurrent liability 
in contract and tort are much more compelling today than in the recent past.96 
The difference in rationales for contract and tort is thought to be 
particularly important in the enforcement and assessment of damages. Contract 
is generally thought to be about compensation for disappointing expectancy 
94 Supra, note 29 at 551. 
95 Supra, note 32 at 432. See also, Ibid. at 435 and 440 per Bridge and at 447 per Oliver. 
96 See Cane, "Contract, Tort and Economic Loss" in The Law of Tort: Policies and Trends in 
Liability for Damage to Property and Economic Loss, ed. by M. Funnston, (London: Duckworth, 
1986) at 113. 
CRITICAL LEGAL STIJDIES AND POST-MODERNISM 
and reliance interest by those who fail to keep agreements. This is defended 
as morally justified and economically warranted because it rewards initiative, 
promotes certainty and internalizes externalities. On the other hand, tort is 
generally considered to be about remedying wrongful violation to established 
interests by those who act below conununity standards. This is treated as 
morally justified and economically warrant.ed because it deters the taking of 
unreasonable risks and allocates risks to those who are best able to bear 
them. As will be obvious, these general distinguishing features run into 
difficulties in economic loss cases, especially in situations like Mrs. 
Donoghue' s where the claim is for expectancy losses resulting from a defective 
product. The argument is that any loss ·in value is an expectancy loss and 
therefore only recoverable in contract as it is "only out of bargains that 
expectations as to quality arise and only by reference to bargains that they 
can be measured. " 97 
Yet., on closer inspection, the concrete details of contract and tort doctrines 
suggest a different reality. The neat bifurcation of civil obligation into distinct 
analytical categoties becomes much more blurred and much less convincing. 
Those ideas that have govemed in contract have also had an influential role in 
the development in tort (and vice versa). For instance, although tort appears to 
do away with notions of privity, it relies upon analogous notions of proximity 
and foreseeability to achieve the same limiting of legal obligation and recovery. 
Also, through a variety of doctrinal devices, contract imposes obligations where 
they were not voluntarily assumed and relieves parties of obligations where 
they were voluntarily assumed: the notion of 'voluntariness' in contract is as 
much a cover for a vast range of conflicting norms as 'proximity' is in tort.98 
Moreover, it is far from obvious whether certain factual situations can or should 
be classified into the contract or tort branch of civil obligation. There is of a 
continuum that covers those circumstances that are largely of a contractual 
nature, such as Pettick and Murphy, a mix of negligence and contract., such as 
Ross andy Hedley Byrne, and those that are largely non-contractual in nature, 
such as Norsk and Caltex. Consequently, economic loss is a matter of tort and 
contract; it cannot be excluded from one category to be considered exclusively 
by the other category. Law imposes private obligations through contract as 
much as it imposes public obligations through tort. 
97 Cane, ibi,d. at 138. Of course, the categorisation of pure economic loss as more appropriately 
to be a matter of contract law does not slam the door in Mrs. Donoghue's face. Although the 
prospect of recovery by her for the discounted value of the ginger beer is remote in light of 
recent developments in contract doctrine (supra), it is possible to imagine and construct a plausible 
argument that a sympathetic court might be willing to accept. Possible lines of argument include 
implied agency, assignment and third party benefits. For instance, it might be viable to pursue 
the opening in Lambert v. Lewis, [1982] A.C. 225. For a general discussion, see Collins, supra, 
note 85 and S. Waddams, Milner's Cases and Materials 011 Contract (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 1985). 
98 Supra, pp. 287-290. 
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Mindful that both contract and tort protect future interests and expectancy 
values, the central issue is not whether pure economic loss should or should 
not be recoverable, but whether the behaviour that results in such loss should 
be dealt with as a matter of tort, contract or both .. Although its precise nature 
and level is unsettled and contentious, contract an<;l tort are moving toward 
protecting "dependency". This makes the distinction between expectancy and 
reliance irrelevant, because, in a dependency relationship, it does not matter 
whether the defendant is providing a benefit (expectancy) or is entrusted to 
exercise a skill (reliance). Knowledge of dependency concerns both the 
defendant knowing about the plaintiffs reliance on the actions of the defendant 
and the plaintiffs knowledge of its expectations from the defendant. 'The 
most difficult cases are those where the plaintiff has not acted to its detriment, 
despite the defendant's negligence, as in Ross, or where the plaintiff has no 
necessary knowledge of the particular defendant, but reasonably expects that 
the defendant will not act to the plaintiffs detriment, as in Norsk. It should 
make no difference in Pettick, for example, that the university relied on the 
defendants to provide a roof through a contract as much as it relied on them 
to exercise a skill in design based on a tortious duty. If non-privily parties 
of a contractual set of relationships are able to assert a dependency claim in 
tort, parties in a chain of contractual relationships should also be able to 
assert such a claim.99 
Accordingly, notwithstanding the decision in Murphy and Rivtow, there 
seems to be a begrudging acceptance that contract and tort must be viewed 
as being intimately related rather than artificially separated. Donoghue, Hedley 
Byrne and Anns are not restricted to tort cases, but also apply to contract 
relationships. Conversely, as in Pettick, a contractual relationship provides 
sufficient proximity to ground the finding of a tortious obligation . Moving 
beyond Nunes Diamond, 100 the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the 
existence of a contractual relationship does not automatically obliterate any 
tortious responsibilities between the parties. Rafuse concedes that tort 
obligations are owed between all people and that contract functions to vary 
those pre-existing duties. The existence of a contract does not bring the parties 
into a legal relationship, but works to change the nature of that relationship. 
While Rafuse and Pettick are concerned with cases extending the 
principles of Hedley Byrne, there should be no reason to exclude manufacturing 
from tl1ese statement-based principles. As John McLaren puts it, modem reality 
is "a transactional environment moulded by a mass production economy and 
an ever more complex division of labour in the provision of goods and 
services.,,101 While the fear of a transmissible warranty of quality is never 
99 See Cane, supra, note 96 at 124-32. 
100 Nu~s Diamond Ud. v. Dominion Electric Protection Co., [1972] S.C.R. 769. 
101 McLaren, "The Convergence of Contract and Tort: A Return To A More Venerable Wisdom?" 
(1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 30 at 59. 
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really justified in Murphy, it is entirely consistent with conventional notions 
of implied warranty and, in property law, with covenants and easements, 
which are largely contractual in origin. Ultimately, ideas of warranty involve 
problems about the standard of care owed, not whether a duty of care is in 
fact owed. The hard case arises, as in Junior Books, where the plaintiff expected 
a floor at a higher standard than the defendant provided. However, in these 
contractual cases, traditional contract law has a greater role to play in adjudging 
the standard of care than tort. Although a duty of care was reasonably found 
to exist in Junior Books, there was no real inquiry as to whether the defendant 
actually knew it was under the higher contractual standard of care. If it did, 
it should have been held to that higher standard; if it did not, the tort (and, 
in this case, lower) standard of care should be applied. 
Although Rafuse concerned a tort claim between the contracting parties 
themselves, its logic and sense extend to situations in which the tort claim 
is between parties who are not between themselves in a contractual relationship, 
but where at least one of them is party to a relevant contract. This issue is 
particularly pressing in the case of extending limitations of liability outside 
the bounds of a strict contractual relationship. It was raised in Pettick, but 
the court skirted around it. As the case was more about a contract than a 
tort, it should have been considered as such by the court. Even though the 
plaintiff was forced to frame the case in tort, the contract provisions would 
be read into and temper the tort standard. In Pettick, the dissent accepted 
that the limitation could create a collateral warranty; the one year warranty 
made would apply to the plaintiff even though the warranty was apparently 
made between the manufacturer and architect, but not the owner. The effect 
of this argument was to establish a transmissible warranty of limitation. 102 
Of cour:se, it seems fair that, if plaintiffs are to be bound by a transmissible 
warranty of limitation, they ought to be able to avail themselves of a 
transmissible warranty of quality. 
In economic loss cases involving related contracts, liability or recovery 
ought not to be an all-or-nothing matter. It is as wrong for manufacturers to 
always be fully liable to everyone, regardless of the terms of the initial sale 
of the goods or services, as it is for them to be liable to no one other than 
the original purchaser. The original contract should affect the nature of the 
manufacturers' liability, but it should not be its exclusive determinant. In 
102 These limitation clauses must also be subject to the general contractual rules of validity in 
such cases. See Smith v. Bush, (1990] A.C. 831, and Hunter v. Syncrude, [1989] I S.C.R. 426. 
In line with this, the decision in Pettick should be criticized. The one year warranty of quality 
did not contain any disclaimer of liability, but there was a specific clause disclaiming other 
liability except as provided in the one year warranty. The court stated that: "The warranty is a 
bargain that holds the contractor liable irrespective of negligence for a period of time. A tort 
claim requires proof of negligence. That it should continue beyond the warranty period does 
not interfere with the legitimate expectations of the parties as to their contractual relationship." 
Ibid. at 658-59. 
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effect, Mrs. Donoghue should be able to recover for the reduced value of 
the ginger beer, but her claim should be conditioned or considered in light 
of the contractual terms of the original sale by David Stephenson. In this 
way, it might be possible to retain some equivalen9e between the circumstances 
under which the manufacturer sold the gooq or service and the extent of the 
manufacturer's obligations without placing the consumer in an unfairly 
advantageous or disadvantageous position. Moreover, such a solution draws 
its sustaining appeal and cogency from a judicious blending and borrowing 
from both visions of civil obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
Sixty years have passed since Lord Atkin's . seminal pronouncement in 
Donoghue. He set judges and lawyers off on a quest to work out the 
responsibilities and reach of "neighbourliness" in a changing and challenging 
world. In that time, understandings about the social content and political 
consequences of that contested legal concept have gone through many 
characterisations and incarnations. As a predictable result, the legal doctrine 
of civil obligation bas gone through many permutations and patterns. At the 
heart of this legal struggle remains the torturous relationship of contract and 
tort. While they seem forever destined to remain as close companions in the 
common law's family, they are categorically unable to effect any compatible 
mode of peaceful co-existence. The present state of affairs is as tenuous and 
volatile as any previous chapter in the common law's continuing saga. On 
viewing the gothic saga of civil obligation, Maitland could be forgiven a 
knowing, if rueful smile: it would not take such an astute critic of the common 
law long to notice the extent to which the ghosts of judges past still haunt 
contemporary law and the forms of action still rule us from the grave. 
In this essay, we have sought to demonstrate that the law of recovery 
for pure economic loss cannot be rationally defended or intellectually justified 
within the Jaw's own frame of reference. Without the demonstration of such 
an internal or immanently rational account, any judicial or jurisprudential 
attempt to preserve the distinctiveness of law from politics is fatally 
compromised. Of course, as David Howarth has insisted, in tracing the recent 
development of tort law, "the rise of [Thatcherite] values ... is not a complete 
explanation" and reference to such visionary intimations cannot account for 
the exact pattern of judicial decisions.103 However, in contrast to Howarth 
and most tort scholars, we do not believe that any greater precision can be 
achieved by focusing more keenly on the conceptual framework within which 
the Jaw works and develops. Doctrinal confusion is not a condition to be 
ameliorated by prescribing a more healthy rhetorical diet and conceptual 
work-out program for the judges. The relation between law and its larger 
socio-political context is indetefminate and indeterminately so: there is no 
103 Howanh, "Negligence after Murphy: Time To Re-think" 50 Camb. L.J. 58 at 66 and 68. 
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analytically snug fit between the two. Furthermore, tbe deficit in rationality 
and explanation cannot be met in any consistent or coherent way. Whereas 
tbe fit between doctrinal development and politics seems particularly close 
in the English law of tortious recovery for economic loss, there is a much 
greater and less complementary space between them in Canada. Contingency 
is the body and soul of law and legal theory. 
Even when there is a strong parallel between narrow legal doctrine and 
broader socio-political currents, as appears to be presently so in England, 
tbere is always a precedential fly in the explanatory ointment. For instance, 
the decision of tbe House of Lords in Sm,ith v. Bush104 is such an entomological 
irritant. In relying upon the defendants' negligent survey in purchasing a 
house, the plaintiff sought damages for the cost of unanticipated repairs. 1l1e 
survey had been carried out for the obtaining of a mortgage and the mortgage 
company had disclaimed liability for the accuracy of any survey. As the 
survey was for valuation rather than structural purposes, the mortgage company 
advised the plaintiff to obtain independent professional advice. Moreover, 
the defendant surveyors had included a disclaimer in their report. Tue plaintiff 
was successful. The House of Lords placed considerable weight on the 
plaintiff's unequal bargaining power and his actual reliance on the 
professional's advice. Such a decision, by allowing tort liability to trump the 
existence of two separate contractual disclaimers, is very difficult to reconcile 
with the general retrenchment from legally-enforced social responsibilities 
that is represented by Murphy; the court's conununitarian solicitude for 
ordinary consumers stands in stark contrast to its general allegiance to a 
broadly individualistic vision of civil obligation. 
In accounting for the decision in Smith v. Bush, we say that it is "very 
difficult'', rather than impossible, to reconcile with the prevailing 
individualistic turn in the judicial doctrine of civil obligations. An imaginative 
reading of Smith v. Bush discloses that its rationale is consistent with such 
an individualistic tendency. Although less glaring and more strained, the 
decision can be plausibly justified in terms of individualistic rhetoric: the 
imposition of liability upon professional surveyors is explicable as a recognition 
of the need for robust self-discipline and personal responsibility by all sectors 
of society, including its more privileg~ ones. As such, it can be contended 
that any attempt to account for judicial decisions in terms of one overriding 
general vision or conceptual logic will always be confounded. Nevertheless, 
the changing fate of claims for the recovery of economic loss· over the last 
couple of decades offers a neat illustration of the confluence, albeit 
indeterminately contingent and contingently indeterminate, between legal 
doctrine and political context as mediated through competing visions of civil 
obligation. 
104 Supra, note 102. 
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In bis judgment in the Federal Court of Appeal in Norsk, Macguigan J. 
opines that "the law demands some perception of justice for its life, even 
while it requires some channelling of justice for its survival. " 105 As elegant 
and pithy as this judicial piece of wisdom is, it. merely serves to underline 
rather than resolve the enduring intractability of law's dilemma. In the area 
of civil obligations and, in particular, in the recovery for economic loss, law 
can only ensure its survival by doing what threatens its life and can only 
continue its life by doing what jeopardizes its survival. Caught in such an 
existential bind, the only course of action is, like in the movies, to hope that 
the public will close its eyes to reality and dream of better days to come. In 
this, film-makers and lawyers have much in common - they are both in the 
visionary business of blurring the thin line between life and art. Whether art 
mimics life or life mimics art, mimicry is the cinematic name of the judicial 
game. 
I 
IOS C:N.R. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. Lid. (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th) 320 at 360 per Macguigan 
J. (Fed. C.A.). 
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